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Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel: Is the Court One Step Closer to
Unraveling the Takings and Due Process Clauses?
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution contains two
provisions that protect private property interests: the Due Process
Clause and the Takings Clause.1 The Due Process Clause states that
"[n]o person shall be ... deprived of ... property, without due
process of law"' and is intended to prevent "arbitrary or irrational
legislation."3  The Takings Clause provides, "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation"4 and is
concerned with "providing compensation for legitimate government
action that takes 'private property.' "I Despite distinct constitutional
language, the Supreme Court has created a muddled mess of the
Takings and the Due Process Clauses.6
How the Court got into this mess is readily apparent. During the
early part of the twentieth century, the Court frequently overturned
economic regulations on due process grounds.7 By the mid-1930s,
however, the Court had stopped this practice,8 and by 1955, the Court
had virtually emasculated the Due Process Clause as it related to
economic regulation.9 Litigators, therefore, began looking to the
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2163 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2161 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6. See John D. Echeverria & Sharon Dennis, The Takings Issue and the Due Process
Clause: A Way Out of a Doctrinal Confusion, 17 VT. L. R V. 695, 696-97 (1993)
(discussing the Court's "muddling" of the Due Process and Takings Clauses); see also
Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1607 n.40 (1988) ("[J]udges
and commentators have [not] always maintained a clear distinction between the 'due
process' and 'takings' inquiries .... ).
7. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.3, at
374-82 (5th ed. 1995).
8. The Court relented from its previous approach under tremendous pressure from
President Franklin D. Roosevelt to permit his New Deal legislation to stand, as it was
intended to lead the country out of the Great Depression. See WILLIAM LASSER, THE
LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 153-54
(1988).
9. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ("The
day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause ... to strike down state laws,
regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident,
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Takings Clause as the only source of protection against regulations
that interfered with private economic interests'? Wanting results
that historically could have been achieved through the Due Process
Clause, these litigators imported due process concepts into their
Takings Clause analyses." The Court, with little judicial
interpretation of the Takings Clause upon which to base its opinions,
followed the lead of these parties and applied due process principles
in adjudicating these challenges.' As a result, the Court's regulatory
takings analysis has developed into a substantive review of
government regulation that has incorporated standards historically
used in due process review." This borrowing of principles has
confused the distinction between the Due Process Clause and the
Takings Clause and has transformed the Court's regulatory takings
analysis into a body of law that has proven to be confusing and
unpredictable. 4
Eastern Enterprises v. ApfeP5 is a recent example of the Court's
inconsistent treatment of the distinction between the Due Process
and Takings Clauses. In this case, the Court held that the Coal Act, 16
as applied to Eastern Enterprises, Inc. ("Eastern"), violated the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 7  Due to a split of opinion
regarding the judgment and its appropriate rationale, the actual
or out of harmony with a particular school of thought."); see also Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372
U.S. 726, 731 (1963) (stating that the Court has abandoned the "use of the 'vague
contours' of the Due Process Clause to nullify laws which a majority of the Court believ[e]
to be economically unwise"); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 7, § 11.4, at 388 (discussing
the demise of economic substantive due process).
"Economic legislation" can be defined generally as legislation that alters the
economic relations between parties, including regulation of prices, labor legislation, and
restrictions on entry into business. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 829 (3d ed. 1996).
10. See Glen E. Summers, Comment, Private Property Without Lochner: Toward a
Takings Jurisprudence Uncorrupted by Substantive Due Process, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 837,
844 (1993).
11. See id. at 846.
12. See id. at 844-46.
13. See Echeverria & Dennis, supra note 6, at 695; Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of
Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on Economic Regulation, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 605, 647 (1996).
14. See Echeverria & Dennis, supra note 6, at 695; see also Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct.
at 2155 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) ("Cases
attempting to decide when a regulation becomes a taking are among the most litigated and
perplexing in current law.").
15. 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998).
16. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-9722 (1994). See infra notes 43-53 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the relevant portions of the Coal Act.
17. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2137 (plurality opinion).
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holding in Eastern Enterprises is quite narrow.18 The concurring
opinion of Justice Kennedy, read together with Justice Breyer's
dissent, may indicate, however, that a majority of the Court has taken
the first step in distinguishing the Due Process and the Takings
Clauses. In doing so, five Justices arguably rejected two relatively
recent Supreme Court decisions by concluding that, because the Coal
Act was a purely economic regulation, the appropriate analysis was
provided by the Due Process Clause and not the Takings Clause. 9
These same five Justices also distinguished the clauses in another
respect: limiting the use of the Takings Clause to otherwise
legitimate regulations that affect "property."2  Following this
interpretation, Justices Kennedy and Breyer would not use the
Takings Clause to resolve challenges that a regulation is arbitrary or
irrational.21  Rather, they would limit its use to claims for
compensation due to a "taking" of private property by an otherwise
valid regulation and would leave to the jurisdiction of the Due
Process Clause claims that a regulation is arbitrary or irrational.22
Based on these two apparent distinctions, an independence of the
Due Process and the Takings Clauses may be taking shape.
This Note first presents the history that led Congress to enact the
Coal Act and thereby caused Eastern to file suit.23 After describing
the facts and holding, the Note outlines the differing opinions in
Eastern Enterprises, paying special attention to the applicability of
18. Justice O'Connor authored the plurality opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined, and argued that the Coal Act as applied to Eastern
violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at
2137 (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy, writing alone, argued that the Coal Act as
applied to Eastern violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See id at
2154 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). Justice Breyer,
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, argued that the Coal Act as applied to
Eastern violated neither the Due Process nor the Takings Clause. See id. at 2161 (Breyer,
J., dissenting). This splintered opinion means that the only binding aspect of Eastern
Enterprises is the specific result-the Coal Act is unconstitutional as applied to Eastern.
See Association of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Apfel, 156 F.3d 1246, 1255 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
19. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2157 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part); id. at 2163 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
20. See i&t at 2159 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); id.
at 2164 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
21. See id. at 2158 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); id.
at 2163 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
22 See id. at 2158 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); id.
at 2163 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
23. See infra notes 32-53 and accompanying text.
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the Takings Clause to Eastern's claim.24 Following a brief discussion
of the Due Process Clause,' the Note examines the relevant
background law of the Takings Clause.26 The Note then posits that
Justice Kennedy and the four dissenters refused to follow portions of
two previous Court decisions that permitted Takings Clause review
of economic regulations.27  After expanding on the dissent's
arguments that the Takings Clause does not apply to economic
regulations," the Note asserts that these same five Justices further
espoused limiting the Takings Clause to the review of otherwise valid
regulations.29 Next, the Note suggests that the plurality opinion in
Eastern Enterprises inappropriately imports substantive due process
principles into its regulatory takings analysis.30  Finally, the Note
proposes that the Court use the Eastern Enterprises decision as a step
towards distinguishing the Takings and Due Process Clauses. 31
Eastern, a Massachusetts Business Trust,32 was formed in 1929
and until 1965 conducted significant coal-mining operations.33 As did
many companies in the coal industry in 1950, Eastern signed the
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950 ("1950
Agreement"), which created the United Mine Workers of America
Welfare and Retirement Fund ("1950 W&R Fund")34 Under the
24. See infra notes 54-95 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 102-40 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 141-61 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 162-81 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 187-206 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
32. A Massachusetts Business Trust is a business organization created by deed or
declaration of trust under which business assets are managed for the benefit of those
holding beneficial interest in the trust. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 1.13,
at 20-22 (1997).
33. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2142 (plurality opinion). In 1965, Eastern
transferred all of its coal operations to a newly created and wholly-owned subsidiary,
Eastern Associated Coal Corporation ("EACC"). See id. at 2143 (plurality opinion).
After the transfer of its coal assets to EACC, Eastern's coal division ceased to exist. See
Brief for Petitioner at 4, Eastern Enters. (No. 97-42). From 1965 until 1987, Eastern
owned EACC, first directly and then through an intermediary subsidiary. See Eastern
Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2143 (plurality opinion). In 1987, Eastern sold all the stock of EACC
and the intermediary subsidiary. See id. (plurality opinion).
34. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2137-38 (plurality opinion). For the better part
of this century, tumultuous relations between coal miners and their employers have
troubled the coal industry, with health care benefits playing a prominent role in the
relations. See Brief for Federal Respondent at 2, Eastern Enters. (No. 97-42). In 1946,
negotiations between the United Mine Workers of America ("UMWA") and the coal
operators broke down, and a nationwide strike resulted. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at
2137 (plurality opinion). President Truman issued an executive order instructing the
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terms of the 1950 Agreement, signatory coal operators agreed to
make fixed royalty payments to the 1950 W&R Fund based on the
amount of coal produced." The coal operators, however, did not
explicitly promise the miners lifetime health care benefits; instead,
the health care benefits provided by the fund were subject to the
complete discretion of the fund's trustees.36 Even though health care
benefits were established and could be altered at the discretion of the
trustees, the fund provided lifetime health care benefits to miners
during most of the term of the 1950 Agreement. 37
The 1950 W&R Fund continued to provide health care benefits
to coal miners until 1974.38 In 1974, due in part to changes in the
law,39 the coal miners' union and the coal operators entered into a
new agreement that replaced the 1950 W&R Fund with two benefit
plans: the 1950 Benefit Plan and the 1974 Benefit Plan. Unlike the
Secretary of the Interior to take possession of all coal mines and to negotiate a settlement
between the miners and the employers. See id. (plurality opinion). The resulting
agreement, known as the Krug-Lewis Agreement, led to the National Bituminous Coal
Wage Agreement of 1947. See id. (plurality opinion). Due to conflicts between the
miners and employers over the operation of that fund, the 1947 agreement was
renegotiated and the 1950 W&R Fund was established. See iL at 2138 (plurality opinion).
See generally John R. Woodrum & Larry P. Rothman, Proposals for Funding United Mine
Workers of America Retiree Health Benefits: The Constitutional Dimensions, 93 W. VA. L.
REV. 633, 639-40 (1991) (stating that a strike ensued when operators refused to agree "in
principle" to the union demand for a health and retirement fund).
35. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2137-38 (plurality opinion).
36. See id. (plurality opinion). The 1950 W&R Fund's Annual Report for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1955, explained the discretion of the trustees:
"Under the legal and financial obligations ... imposed [by the Trust Agreement],
the Fund is operated on a pay-as-you-go basis, maintaining a sound relationship
between revenues and expenditures. Resolutions adopted by the Trustees
governing [health care benefits] specifically provide that all ... [b]enefits are
subject to termination, revision, or amendment, by the Trustees in their
discretion at any time. No vested interest in the Fund extends to any
beneficiary."
Id. at 2138 (plurality opinion) (quoting the 1950 W&R Fund's 1955 Annual Report).
37. See id. at 2139 (plurality opinion). The trustees did reduce the benefits provided
to the miners several times under the terms of the 1950 Agreement due to budget
constraints. See id. (plurality opinion). These reductions caused wildcat strikes during the
1960s. See id. (plurality opinion).
38. See id (plurality opinion). The 1950 W&R Fund was modified several times
between 1950 and 1974; the basic agreement remained unchanged, however. See id.
(plurality opinion). Specifically, the trustees retained discretion over employee benefits
and lifetime health care benefits were not guaranteed. See id (plurality opinion).
39. In 1974, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")
altered the pension funding requirements, which created the need for a new agreement.
See Brief for Petitioner at 5, Eastern Enters. (No. 97-42).
40. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2139 (plurality opinion); Brief for the Federal
Respondent at 4, Eastern Enters. (No. 97-42).
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previous funds, these plans specifically guaranteed lifetime health
care benefits for miners as well as health care benefits to miners'
widows until their death or remarriage.4' Due in part to the
broadened coverage, the 1950 Benefit Plan and the 1974 Benefit Plan
quickly developed financial problems.42
Because of these problems, the federal government enacted the
Coal Act in 1992.43 Intended to ensure that certain retired coal
miners receive the lifetime health care benefits to which they are
entitled, 44 the Coal Act merged the 1950 and 1974 Benefit Plans into
a new plan called the United Mine Workers of America Combined
Benefit Fund (the "Combined Fund").45 The Coal Act financed the
Combined Fund with annual premiums assessed against certain
"signatory operators. '46 Signatory operators were coal operators that
41. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2139-40 (plurality opinion).
42. See id. at 2140 (plurality opinion). The 1974 Benefit Plan was modified in 1978 in
an attempt to bolster its financial position. See id. (plurality opinion). The 1978 National
Bituminous Coal Wage Act made three primary modifications to the 1974 Benefit Plan.
See Brief for Petitioner at 5, Eastern Enters. (No. 97-42). First, signatory employees of the
1978 agreement were assigned responsibility for the health care benefits of their own
active employees and their former employees who had retired after 1975. See id. The
1974 Benefit Plan, however, was left intact to cover "orphaned" retiree miners-those
retirees whose employers were no longer in the coal business. See id. Second, coal
operators no longer made a fixed contribution to the trust based on coal production;
rather, the 1978 agreement obligated operators to make contributions sufficient to
maintain the promised benefits. See id. Finally, the operators signed "evergreen" clauses
under which they agreed to contribute to the 1974 Benefit Plan as long as they stayed in
the coal business. See id. Despite these modifications, the financial woes of both benefit
plans continued. See id.
When the signatory coal operators withdrew from the agreements-either to mine
coal with non-union workers or to exit the coal business altogether-the financial
problems of the benefit plans multiplied. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2140 (plurality
opinion). These withdrawals resulted in higher contribution commitments on the part of
the remaining coal operators, which, in turn, led to more employers exiting the coal
business and worsening financial problems for the trusts. See id. (plurality opinion).
43. See Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act, Publ. L. No. 102-486, § 19143(a),
106 Stat. 3037 (1992) (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-9722 (1994)). In 1988, the Secretary of
Labor created the Advisory Commission on the United Mine Workers of America Retiree
Health Benefits ("Coal Commission") and charged it with recommending a solution that
would ensure that the orphan retirees covered by the 1950 and 1974 Benefit Plans would
continue to receive promised health care. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2140 (plurality
opinion). The legislation resulting from the recommendations of the Coal Commission is
known as the Coal Act. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-9706; Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2141
(plurality opinion).
44. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 19142, 106 Stat. 2776, 3037
(1992) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 9701 (1994)) (stating that the Coal Act was
intended to "remedy problems with the provision and funding of health care benefits with
respect to the beneficiaries of [coal industry] multiemployer benefit plans").
45. See 26 U.S.C. § 9702(a)(2); Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2142 (plurality opinion).
46. 26 U.S.C. § 9701(c)(1), (3).
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signed any National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement
("NBCWA") or any other agreement requiring contributions to the
1950 or 1974 Benefit Plans.47 Even though Eastern did not sign the
1974 or subsequent agreements, it was subject to the Coal Act
because it had signed the 1950 Agreement. a8
Under the Coal Act, premiums are assessed only against those
signatory operators that have been assigned coal industry retirees.4 9
Retirees are assigned to a signatory coal operator based on a three-
pronged statutory analysis.50 The signatory coal operator is then
responsible for paying the premiums necessary to provide health care
to the assigned retirees.5 1  The Social Security Administration
assigned Eastern over a thousand retired miners under the third
prong of the Coal Act analysis;52 these retired miners had worked
more years for Eastern prior to the effective date of the 1978
Agreement than for any other signatory coal operator.5 3
After the Social Security Commission assessed Eastern for
premiums under § 9706(a)(3) of the Coal Act, Eastern filed suit
47. See id. § 9701(b)(1).
48. See id. § 9701(b)(1), (c)(1); Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2143 (plurality opinion).
49. See 26 U.S.C. § 9704(b)(1).
50. See icL § 9706(a). Under § 9706:
the Commissioner of the Social Security shall... assign each coal industry retiree
who is an eligible beneficiary to a signatory operator which ... remains in
business in the following order:
(1) First, to the signatory operator which-
(A) was a signatory to the 1978 coal wage agreement or any subsequent
coal wage agreement, and
(B) was the most recent signatory operator to employ the coal industry
retiree in the coal industry for at least 2 years.
(2) Second, if the retiree is not assigned under paragraph (1), to the
signatory operator which-
(A) was a signatory to the 1978 coal wage agreement or any subsequent
coal wage agreement, and
(B) was the most recent signatory operator to employ the coal industry
retiree in the coal industry.
(3) Third, if the retiree is not assigned under paragraph (1) or (2), to the
signatory operator which employed the coal industry retiree in the coal
industry for a longer period of time than any other signatory operator prior
to the effective date of the 1978 coal wage agreement.
Id.
51. See ic § 9704(a)-(b); Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2141-43 (plurality opinion).
52 See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2143 (plurality opinion).
53. See id. (plurality opinion). Generally, the miners assigned to Eastern were not
assigned under the first or second prong of the statute because either they retired before
the effective date of the 1978 Agreement or, if they had worked after the 1978 Agreement,
the coal operators they had worked for had since gone out of business. See id. (plurality
opinion).
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against the Social Security Administration, claiming that the
application of the Coal Act violated the Due Process and Takings
Clauses of the Fifth Amendment.' Because it had never signed an
agreement that promised lifetime health care benefits to the miners
and it had been out of the coal industry since 1965, Eastern argued
that the application of the Coal Act violated the Due Process Clause
because it imposed severe retroactive liability unrelated to Eastern's
participation in the multiemployer plans.5 Moreover, Eastern
argued that the Coal Act took its property without just compensation
in violation of the Takings Clause.56 Eastern requested both a
declaratory judgment that the Coal Act as applied to Eastern
violated the Constitution and an injunction preventing its
enforcement against Eastern.57 The U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts denied Eastern's motion for summary
judgment and entered judgment for the Social Security
Administration.8 On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision,59 and subsequently the Supreme Court granted
54. See id. at 2143 (plurality opinion).
55. See Brief for Petitioner at 21-35, Eastern Enters. (No. 97-42).
56. See idL at 35-50.
57. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2144-45 (plurality opinion). Originally, there was
a challenge to the Court's jurisdiction. Under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994), the
U.S. Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the United States for
money damages exceeding $10,000, see id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). Therefore, claims that
the government has taken property generally must first be litigated in the Court of Claims.
See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2144 (plurality opinion). Only upon denial of
compensation by the Court of Claims is a Takings Clause claim ripe for a suit in a U.S.
District Court. See id. (plurality opinion); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
1016-19 (1984). Eastern Enterprises, however, was requesting an injunction against the
enforcement of the Coal Act rather than requesting money damages. See Eastern Enters.,
118 S. Ct. at 2144-45 (plurality opinion). Even though the Government dropped its
objection to the jurisdictional issue, the plurality addressed the issue and determined that
the district court properly had jurisdiction over Eastern's equitable claim. See id. at 2144-
46 (plurality opinion).
While the Court was deciding this case, a bill was progressing through Congress that
would have amended the Tucker Act. See S. REP. No. 84-2, at 5 (1998). One of the
provisions of the bill would have eliminated this jurisdictional issue for future claims
against the government. See id. The bill passed the House, see id., but stalled in the
Senate, see 144 CONG. REC. S8022-02 (daily ed. July 13, 1998).
58. See Eastern Enters. v. Shalala, 942 F. Supp. 684, 689 (D. Mass. 1996), aff'd sub
nom. Eastern Enters. v. Chater, 110 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom. Eastern
Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998).
59. See Eastern Enters., 110 F.3d at 162. The First Circuit rejected Eastern's
substantive due process claim by relying on the deferantial standard of review associated
with the substantive due process review of economic regulations. See id. at 155-56. The
court held that the Coal Act as applied to Eastern was rational because "Eastern ...
contributed directly to the mine workers' legitimate expectations of lifetime health
benefits." Id at 157. In response to Eastern's takings claim, the court applied the three
1532 [Vol. 77
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certiorari. 0
In a five-to-four decision reversing the lower court, the Supreme
Court ruled in favor of Eastern, no rationale capturing a majority of
the Court.61 Justice O'Connor, joined by three Justices, wrote the
plurality opinion concluding that the Coal Act as applied to Eastern
violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.62 Classifying
the Coal Act as an economic regulation that may "nonetheless effect
a taking,"63 the plurality stated that Eastern was " 'permanently
deprived of those assets necessary to satisfy its statutory
obligation.' "I
After deciding that the Takings Clause provided the appropriate
analysis, the plurality employed the same regulatory takings analysis
that the Court had used in Concrete Pipe & Products of California,
Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust65 and Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.66  Under this analysis, the Court
factor regulatory takings analysis. See id. at 160; see also infra note 114 and accompanying
text (discussing the regulatory takings analysis). Relying on precedent and its belief that
Eastern contributed to the miners' expectations of health care benefits, the court had no
trouble concluding that the Coal Act as applied to Eastern did not violate the Takings
Clause. See Eastern Enters., 110 F.3d at 160-62.
60. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 334 (1997). Prior to the Court granting
certiorari, the Courts of Appeal for the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits
had upheld the application of the Coal Act against constitutional challenges. See Holland
v. Keenan Trucking Co., 102 F.3d 736, 739-42 (4th Cir. 1996); Lindsey Coal Mining Co. v.
Chater, 90 F.3d 688, 693-95 (3d Cir. 1996); In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., 79 F.3d 516, 521-
26 (6th Cir. 1996); Davon, Inc. v. Shalala, 75 F.3d 1114, 1121-30 (7th Cir. 1996); In re
Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478, 486-96 (2d Cir. 1995). At least 40 federal judges have
concluded that the Coal Act is constitutional. See Brief for Respondents the UMWA
Combined Benefit Fund and its Trustees at 20, Eastern Enters. (No. 97-42) (listing judges).
61. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2153-54, 2161 (plurality opinion). Even though
no specific constitutional doctrine captured the whole Court, it could be argued that all
nine Justices framed the issue as whether or not the Coal Act held Eastern retroactively
liable for a problem that it did not cause. See The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 112
HARV. L. REv. 122, 219-20 (1998) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (stating that all nine
Justices in Eastern Enterprises focused on whether or not the Coal Act was retroactive).
62. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2137 (plurality opinion). Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined in the plurality opinion. See id at 2134 (plurality
opinion). Justice Thomas also wrote a concurring opinion stating his view that the Ex Post
Facto Clause of the Constitution could prohibit retroactive civil laws. See id. at 2154
(Thomas, J., concurring). Historically, the Court has only applied the Ex Post Facto
Clause to criminal statutes. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798).
63. Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2146 (plurality opinion).
64. Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S.
211, 222 (1986)). The plurality was able to use Takings Clause analysis because it viewed
the Coal Act as a deprivation of property.
65. 508 U.S. 602 (1993).
66. 475 U.S. 211 (1986). The plaintiffs in Concrete Pipe and Connolly, like those in
Eastern Enterprises, complained of statutes that imposed retroactive liability and affected
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engaged in an "ad hoc, factual inquir[y]" in an attempt to determine
what constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment.67  In
performing this factual inquiry, the Court relied on three factors:
"(1) 'the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant'; (2) 'the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations'; and (3) 'the character of the
governmental action.' "61 The plurality determined that all three
factors indicated that the Coal Act as applied to Eastern constituted
a regulatory taking.69
First, the plurality stated that the statute subjected Eastern to
substantial economic burden because Eastern was deprived of its
assets and the deprivation was substantial.70  The plurality then
assessed the proportionality of the economic impact of the statute to
Eastern's experience with the retirement plan.7' In deciding that the
statute was not proportional, the plurality relied on the fact that
Eastern had ceased coal mining operations in 1965 and had not
participated in the negotiations of nor signed the 1974 or 1978
Agreements. 72 Additionally, it noted that, compared to the 1974
Agreement, the 1950 Agreement provided coal miners with less
generous benefits, which were unvested and subject to alteration or
contractual commitments between private parties. See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 615 n.10;
Connolly, 475 U.S. at 228-29 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In each of these cases, however,
the Court upheld a statute against challenges under the Takings Clause. See Concrete
Pipe, 508 U.S. at 641; Connolly, 475 U.S. at 221. In Eastern Enterprises, the plurality
distinguished these previous decisions because the Coal Act as applied to Eastern imposed
"severe retroactive liability on a limited class of parties that could not have anticipated the
liability, and the extent of that liability [was] substantially disproportionate to the parties'
experience." Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2149 (plurality opinion).
67. Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 643 (quoting Connolly, 475 U.S. at 224). The plurality
also distinguished Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976), and Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984). In those cases, statutes
similar to the Coal Act were upheld under challenges based on substantive due process
grounds. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2146-47 (plurality opinion).
68. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 224-25 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104,124 (1978)).
69. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2149-53 (plurality opinion).
70. See id. at 2149-50 (plurality opinion). Under the statute, Eastern's cumulative
payments were estimated to be from $50 to $100 million. See id. (plurality opinion).
71. See id. at 2149 (plurality opinion).
72 See id. at 2150 (plurality opinion). The plurality noted that Eastern retained 100%
ownership of EACC-its coal mining subsidiary-until 1987, that EACC had signed the
1974 and 1978 Agreements, and that EACC would be assigned retirees under the Coal
Act, if applicable. See id. (plurality opinion). The plurality also indicated, however, that
Eastern's liability under the Coal Act was not related to Eastern's ownership of EACC.
See id (plurality opinion).
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termination. 3 After considering these facts, the plurality determined
that the economic burden on Eastern was significant.74
Applying the second factor, the plurality noted that "the Coal
Act substantially interfere[d] with Eastern's reasonable investment-
backed expectations." 75 It based this determination on the view that
the Coal Act imposed retroactive liability on Eastern and that it
" 'attache[d] new legal consequences to [an employment relationship]
completed before its enactment.' "76 This conclusion reflects the
plurality's judgment that the coal industry, including Eastern, had not
promised the coal miners lifetime health care benefits prior to 1974.77
This judgment, coupled with the fact that the workers had not been
employed by.Eastern for many years, led the plurality to conclude
that Eastern had developed a protected expectation that any liability
under the 1950 Agreement had been settled.78
Finally, the plurality addressed the character of the
governmental action and described the Coal Act's application to
Eastern as "unusual" because it invoked concerns of fairness.79
Ultimately, the plurality stated that Eastern could not be required to
provide lifetime health care benefits to miners based on activities
that occurred decades before benefits were promised."0 After
73. See id (plurality opinion).
74. See id. at 2150-51 (plurality opinion). The plurality explained that Eastern could
seek indemnification from EACC but that its ability to do so did not alter the fact that
Eastern had been assessed a substantial liability. See id. at 2150 (plurality opinion). The
plurality also addressed the respondent's argument that the Coal Act moderated and
mitigated the economic impact to Eastern in that Eastern was only assessed liability for
those former employees who were not assigned to other employers under 26 U.S.C.
§ 9706(a)(1) and (2). See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2150 (plurality opinion). The
Government took this argument from the Court's language in Connolly; in Eastern
Enterprises, however, the plurality distinguished Connolly. See id. (plurality opinion)
(citing Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225-26 (1986)). It stated
that in Connolly the party subject to liability had control over the factors that moderated
and mitigated the liability, whereas Eastern had no control over the mitigating factors.
See id. (plurality opinion) (citing Connolly, 475 U.S. at 226 n.8).
75. Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2151 (plurality opinion).
76. Id (plurality opinion) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270
(1994)). The opinion also included a discussion regarding the Supreme Court's general
disfavor of retroactive laws. See id- (plurality opinion).
77. See id. at 2152 (plurality opinion). Justice Stevens argued that the plurality's
opinion conflicts with the judgment of Congress and many federal judges. See id. at 2160-
61 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra note 60 (discussing opinions in which judges
have ruled that the Coal Act is constitutional); infra note 197 (discussing the Justices's
differing views of the Coal Act).
78. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2152 (plurality opinion).
79. See i& at 2153 (plurality opinion).
80. See id (plurality opinion).
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deciding that the Coal Act as applied to Eastern violated the Takings
Clause, the plurality concluded that a Due Process analysis was
unnecessary, noting that the Court has expressed concerns about
using the Due Process Clause to invalidate economic legislation.81
Justice Kennedy, writing alone, concurred with the judgment of
the Court, but concluded that the Coal Act as applied to Eastern
violated the Due Process Clause rather than the Takings Clause. 8
After discussing the Court's general distrust for retroactive
legislation, Justice Kennedy gave the Coal Act "careful
consideration. "83 Upon such consideration, he asserted that the
"remedy created by the Coal Act bears no legitimate relation to the
interest which the Government asserts in support of the statute.",' 4
Justice Kennedy's conclusion that the Coal Act as applied to Eastern
violated substantive due process hinged on his belief that Eastern did
not contribute to the expectation of the miners.8 5
Justice Kennedy then argued that the plurality's Takings Clause
analysis was incorrect and unnecessary.8 6  In deciding that the
Takings Clause was inapplicable, Justice Kennedy reasoned that the
Coal Act did not regulate Eastern with regard to property but rather
imposed on Eastern the duty to perform an act: the payment of
benefits.' In his view, the Takings Clause historically has been
limited to cases'in which "a specific property right or interest has
been at stake."' 8 Unlike the plurality, Justice Kennedy interpreted
Connolly and Concrete Pipe not as mandating a regulatory takings
analysis in Eastern Enterprises but rather as requiring the Court to
complete a due process analysis first and use the takings analysis only
in cases in which the governmental action is permissible.89
81. See id. at 2153 (plurality opinion). The plurality cited Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372
U.S. 726, 731 (1963), and Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488
(1955), as cases where the Court had expressed concerns about using the Due Process
Clause to invalidate economic regulation. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2153 (plurality
opinion).
82- See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2154-60 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part).
83. Id at 2158 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
84. Id at 2159 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
85. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
86. See id at 2154-60 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
87. See id. at 2154-58 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
88. Id at 2155 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
Justice Kennedy argued that Eastern was not responsible for the miners' expectations of
lifetime health care benefits. See id. at 2159 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part).
89. See id. at 2157-58 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
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Justice Breyer, joined in dissent by three Justices, agreed with
Justice Kennedy that the Due Process Clause provided the
appropriate analytical framework, but argued that the Coal Act as
applied to Eastern did not violate the Due Process Clause.90 The
dissent so concluded because they believed the coal industry,
including Eastern, had contributed to the miners' expectations of
lifetime health care benefits even before the 1974 Agreement that
explicitly promised such benefits.91 Based on this belief, the dissent
concluded that liability under the Coal Act was rationally related to
Eastern's actions and, therefore, met the rational review standard
applied under substantive due process. 2 The dissent also agreed with
Justice Kennedy's conclusion that the takings analysis was inapposite,
but relied on a different interpretation of Connolly and Concrete Pipe
to distinguish those cases.93 Further, Justice Breyer quoted language
from Connolly stating that the Takings Clause is not violated when
"'the Government does not physically invade or permanently
appropriate any ... assets for its own use.' "94 He also noted that
both Connolly and Concrete Pipe rejected the claim of a takings
violation.9
As evidenced by the split of opinion, the Court struggled to
determine whether the Due Process Clause or the Taking Clause
provided the correct analysis in Eastern Enterprises. The purpose of
substantive due process is to protect "citizens from arbitrary or
irrational legislation. '96  To make this determination, the Court
90. See id. at 2161-68 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, authored a short dissenting opinion stating that the Takings
Clause did not provide the appropriate analysis. See id. at 2160-61 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, Justice Stevens stated his belief that the coal miners and operators
had an implicit agreement that the operators would provide the miners with lifetime
health benefits and characterized that belief as "critical" to the decision in Eastern
Enterprises. See id. at 2160 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Because both Justice Stevens's and
Justice Breyer's opinions reflect the views of the same four justices, when this Note refers
to the views of the dissent, it is referring to the views of the four Justices regardless of the
opinion in which the view is expressed.
91. See id. at 2160-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
92. See id. at 2164 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
93. Compare iL at 2157-58 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in
part) (arguing that Connolly and Concrete Pipe indicated that the Court first should
consider general due process principles, leaving "takings analysis for cases where the
governmental action is otherwise permissible"), with id. at 2162 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that both Connolly and Concrete Pipe "rejected the claim of Takings Clause
violation").
94. Id at 2162 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225).
95. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 2163 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Historically, the Due Process Clause only
afforded persons procedural protection against deprivations of life, liberty or property.
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generally attempts to ascertain whether some set of facts supports the
legislative judgment or end and whether the means chosen by the
legislature are rationally related to that end.97 Additionally, it is well
established that under this analysis the Due Process Clause provides
great judicial deference to the legislative branch, especially in the
review of economic regulations.98
Even though the Court has not overturned a purely economic
regulation under the substantive due process analysis in more than
sixty years,99 the Due Process Clause still provides the Court with a
doctrinal tool to restrict certain government action."' When a statute
violates due process, the remedy is generally an injunction against the
statute's enforcement.' Therefore, even though rarely used since
the New Deal, the Due Process Clause gives the Court the power to
prevent the enforcement of purely economic regulation.
Unlike the Due Process Clause, the Takings Clause is not
intended to prevent government action; rather, it merely conditions
government action on adequate compensation. I0 Historically, the
See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 7, § 11.2, at 369-74. The Court's interpretation of
the Due Process Clause now includes a substantive protection against government
regulation known as substantive due process. See id.
97. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955); United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938); see also STONE ET AL., sUpra
note 9, at 838 (stating that the standard includes an analysis that the means of the
legislation support the justification for the legislation).
98. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (stating that
economic regulations come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality). In part,
this presumption is the reason that the Court has not overturned a purely economic
regulation under the substantive due process analysis in more than 60 years. See Eastern
Enters. v. Chater, 110 F.3d 150, 155 (1st Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom. Eastern Enters. v.
Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the
Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689, 1718 (1984) (discussing the Court's deferential
substantive due process standard in reviewing economic regulations). This has not always
been the rule. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (demonstrating little
deference toward the judgment of a state legislature).
99. See Eastern Enters., 110 F.3d at 155.
100. See STONE ET AL., supra note 9, at 813. It has been argued, however, that the
Court would not sustain any claim of violation of substantive economic rights. See Robert
G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REv. 34,38.
101. See, e.g., Eidev. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716,722 (11th Cir. 1990).
102. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2161 (Breyer, J., dissenting); First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314-15 (1987)
(stating that the Takings Clause is "designed not to limit the governmental interference
with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise
proper interference amounting to a taking"); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960) (stating that the Takings Clause was designed to prevent the government from
forcing people to bear the costs that in all fairness should be borne by the public); see also
STONE ET AL., supra note 9, at 1645-46 (stating that the Takings "[Cilause reflects a
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Court has classified a governmental act as a "taking" only when the
government appropriated title and possession. 3 In 1922, however,
the Court held in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 4 that the
regulation of property could also effect a taking under the Fifth
Amendment. 10 5 Writing for the majority, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes stated that, "while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."' 6
The Pennsylvania Coal precedent places the Court in the difficult
position of distinguishing regulations that reflect the valid exercise of
power from regulations that effect an uncompensated taking-in
other words, deciding how far is "too far."'0 7
Since Pennsylvania Coal, the Court's decisions generally have
divided regulatory takings claims into three categories: (1)
regulations in which the government physically invades or
appropriates property;08 (2) regulations that deprive land of all
judgment that, if government is seeking to produce some public benefit ... it is
appropriate that the payment come from the public at large"). Eastern Enterprises,
however, requested an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the Coal Act. See
Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2144-45 (plurality opinion); see also supra note 57 (discussing
jurisdictional issues in Eastern Enterprises and the Tucker Act).
103. See McUsic, supra note 13, at 612 (citing Callendar v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.)
418 (1823), in which the court ruled there was no taking when the grading of a Boston
street caused extensive damage to an adjacent house); see also MORTON HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, 71-74, 132 (1977) (discussing the
judicial trend in the first half of the nineteenth century in which injurious acts were often
noncompensable unless they were trespasses to land or actual appropriations for public
use); Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional
Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 7 (1991) (stating that, prior to the rise of the regulatory state,
constitutional law only protected private property from seizure).
104. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
105. See id. at 415-16. Justice Kennedy characterized Justice Holmes's statement as
"the genesis of the so-called regulatory takings doctrine." Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at
2154 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). The first time the
Court applied this expanded concept of takings was in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 166 (1872). In Pumpelly, the Court construed the Wisconsin Constitution,
which had an almost identical takings clause as the U.S. Constitution. See id. at 180. The
Court stated that it would be an incorrect result to allow the government to destroy
property but escape payment of compensation simply because it refrained from absolute
conversion of the property. See id. at 176-78.
106. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
107. The Court not only has been in this position before but also has been in this
position often. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2155 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part) (listing by property interest involved the many regulatory
takings cases the Court has heard since Pennsylvania Coal); see also G. Richard Hill,
Introduction: The Takings Decade, in REGULATORY TAKING: THE LIMITS OF LAND USE
CONTROLS at v, xv-xvii (1993) (discussing the guidance provided by cases in the 1980s).
108. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
This first category includes "regulations that compel the property owner to suffer a
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
economically beneficial use;109 and (3) other regulations related to
property that impart economic harm short of depriving the owner of
all beneficial use of the property."0 The third category is the one at
issue in Eastern Enterprises."' In category-three cases, the Court has
attempted to determine if a regulation has "gone too far" by looking
at when " 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused
by public action be compensated by the government, rather than
remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.""2 To so
determine, the Court has used an "ad hoc, factual inquir[y] '' u 3 that
relies substantially on three factors: (1) "the economic impact of the
regulation;" (2) its interference with reasonable investment-backed
expectations; and (3) "the character of the governmental action."'' 4
In addition to expanding the governmental actions that can
constitute a "taking," the Court also has expanded the definition of
"property" for Takings Clause purposes. Originally, the Takings
Clause protected only real or personal property from governmental
appropriation of title or possession."5 The Court, however, has
expanded the definition of property beyond mere title and
physical 'invasion' of his property." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1015 (1992). In analyzing regulations of this type, the Court does not balance the
public purpose of the regulation, nor does it consider the significance of the invasion.
Instead, the Court applies a per se rule: If property is invaded, a taking has occurred. See
id. at 1015. For an example of this type of regulation and the Court's analysis, see Loretto,
458 U.S. at 419. In Loretto, the state passed a statute that required apartment building
owners to allow television cable to be put into their buildings. See id. at 423. The Court
held that the regulation was a taking even though the physical invasion was insignificant.
See id. at 438 n.16.
109. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. This second category of government regulation
includes those regulations that deny all economically beneficial use of land. See id. In
Lucas, the South Carolina Coastal Commission passed a regulation prohibiting
construction in certain beach areas. See id. at 1008-09. Lucas owned two lots within the
newly restricted area on which he planned to build a home. See id. Assuming as fact the
trial court's determination that Lucas's property was worthless, see id. at 1020, the Court
held that the South Carolina regulation effected a taking of Lucas's property, see id. at
1032. The Court again applied a per se rule: If the regulation eliminates all economically
beneficial use of the land and the prohibited use is not a common law nuisance, the
regulation is a taking. See id. at 1027.
110. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 107, 129 (1978).
111. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2146 (plurality opinion).
112 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,175 (1970).
113. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
114. Id In Penn Central, the state passed a regulation restricting the development of
certain historic landmarks. See id. at 115. The owners of Grand Central Terminal sued,
alleging an uncompensated taking. See id. at 119. Although the Court ultimately held that
no taking had resulted, the Court applied these factors to make its determination. See id.
at 124.
115. See McUsic, supra note 13, at 612.
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possession:1 6  "Property" now encompasses specific attributes of
ownership as well. 1 7 In recent cases, the Court has included within
protected property the legal rights associated with property
ownership, such as the right to exclude,"8 the right to control
disposition at death," 9 and the right to all economic use. 2 By
equating "property" with legal and economic rights, the Court's
expanded definition potentially includes all legal expectations.' 2'
The Court's expanded view of the Takings Clause is readily
apparent in Connolly and Concrete Pipe. At issue in Connolly was a
statute imposing withdrawal liability on employers withdrawing from
a multiemployer pension plan."z The pension plan was created in
1960 by an agreement between several thousand employers and their
employees.'13 Under the plan, the employers agreed to pay certain
amounts into trust for the employees' pension benefits, but the
employers could withdraw from the plan without liability. 24 In 1980,
however, Congress passed the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act of 1980 (the "MPPAA"),2 which requires
employers withdrawing from a multiemployer pension plan to
contribute their proportionate share of the plan's unfunded vested
benefits.26 Connolly, a trustee administering the plan, sued, alleging
that this withdrawal liability imposed by the IPPAA effected a
116. See itL at 624-31.
117. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,262 (1980); see also McUsic, supra note
13, at 626-31 (discussing how the Court designated "particular economic interests as
'essential' aspects of property ownership").
11& See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1970) (stating that the
"'right to exclude' ... [is] a fundamental element of the property right [that] falls within
this category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation").
119. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716-17 (1992) (classifying the right to pass
property after death as among " 'the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property' " (quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176)).
120. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992)
(equating all viable economic use of real property as a property right).
121. See McUsic, supra note 13, at 626-31.
122. See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,218 (1986).
123. See id.
124. See id. at 217.
125. The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Publ. L. No. 96-364,
§ 104(2), 94 Stat. 1217, 1217-1267 (1980) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1461
(1994)).
126. See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 213, 216. Because the terms of the plan at issue in
Connolly did not impose liability on withdrawing employers, the MPPAA imposed
liability on employers where contractually there was none. Thus, the statute "'impose[d]
a new duty or liability based on past acts.'" Id. at 223 (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhom
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1,16 (1975)).
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taking of its property without just compensation. 127
In a unanimous decision, the Court ruled that the MPPAA as it
applied to Connolly did not violate the Takings Clause."' The Court
used the three-part regulatory takings analysis that distinguishes a
taking from a valid regulation to determine that the regulation did
not result in a taking. 29 Even though the Court ultimately found that
the regulation did not result in a taking, 30 the Court opened the door
for Eastern's later claim. In making its claim, Connolly equated its
"assets" or economic value with "property" protected under the
Takings Clause. 3' By applying the takings analysis to the contested
statute, the Court implicitly agreed with Connolly's characterization
of economic value as property.132
In Concrete Pipe, Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc.
("Concrete Pipe"), an employer and a former contributor to a
pension plan, withdrew from a pension plan and was assessed
withdrawal liability under the MPPAA.3 Concrete Pipe filed suit
alleging that the MPPAA as applied to it violated both the Due
Process and the Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment."M After
holding that the MPPAA did not violate substantive due process, 135
the Court analyzed Concrete Pipe's takings claim. Because the Court
had previously held that physical appropriations of property were
takings per se, 36 Concrete Pipe argued that the regulation should be
characterized as a physical invasion of property or as destruction of
127. See id. at 219. In Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S.
717 (1984), the Court had already held that the retroactive provisions of the MPPAA did
not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 213.
128. See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 212. In addition, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice
Powell, authored a concurring opinion. See id. at 228 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
129. See id. at 224-25; see also supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (discussing the
factors the Court used in analyzing Connolly's takings claim).
130. See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 227-28.
131. See id. at 221.
132. See id. at 222-28.
133. See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension
Trust, 508 U.S. 602,605 (1993).
134. See id.
135. See id. at 636-41. After noting that it had already concluded that the MPPAA did
not violate substantive due process in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co.,
467 U.S. 717, 720 (1984), the Court applied the deferential standard of review used in
substantive due process challenges to economic regulations and held that the MPPAA did
not violate substantive due process as applied to Concrete Pipe. See Concrete Pipe, 508
U.S. at 641. Concrete Pipe also brought a procedural due process claim that the Court
rejected. See id. at 605.
136. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's per se rule
regarding physical appropriations).
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all economically beneficial use of property.37 The Court, however,
rejected this argument. Applying the three-part test from
Connolly,13 8 the Court unanimously ruled that the statute did not
effect a taking.139 Although it held against Concrete Pipe, by
analyzing Concrete Pipe's claim under takings jurisprudence, the
Court recognized economic value as property protected by the
Takings Clause.40
The statute challenged in Eastern Enterprises, the Coal Act, is
similar to the statute at issue in Connolly and Concrete Pipe,4' and in
both of those cases, a unanimous Court applied the regulatory
takings analysis to the challenged statutes. 42 Because the statute at
issue in Connolly and Concrete Pipe was a purely economic
regulation, it appeared after Connolly and Concrete Pipe that the
Court conclusively had decided that the Takings Clause can apply to
such regulations. The Court's opinion in Eastern Enterprises,
however, throws that apparent certainty into question, because five
Justices concluded that the Takings Clause was inapplicable to the
Coal Act, a purely economic regulation."4  Even though Justice
137. See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 643. Concrete Pipe argued that the property taken
from it was taken in its entirety. See id The Court, however, rejected that argument,
because it would convert all partial takings into total takings. See icL at 644; see also supra
note 108 (discussing per se takings).
138. See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 641-43.
139. See id at 643-44. Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion, disagreed with the
majority regarding an issue unrelated to the takings claim, see id. at 649 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), and Justice O'Connor joined all but
one sentence of the majority opinion, see id at 647 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
140. See id at 643-44.
141. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2146-47 (plurality opinion). The Coal Act is
similar to the statute at issue in Connolly and Concrete Pipe in that both statutes imposed
unexpected monetary obligations based on contractual relationships where previously no
liability existed.
142. See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 643; Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475
U.S. 221, 225 (1986). In Connolly, the Court stated that "[e]xamining the MPPAA [using
the three-part regulatory takings analysis] reinforces our belief that the [MPPAA] does
not constitute a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment." Connolly, 475 U.S. at
225. In Concrete Pipe, the Court stated that "the next step in our analysis is to subject the
operative facts ... to the standards derived from our prior Takings Clause cases."
Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 643. The Court then proceeded to apply the three-part
regulatory takings analysis. See id at 644-47.
143. See McUsic, supra note 13, at 655-56 & n.213.
144. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2154 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part); id. at 2161 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Thomas W. Merrill,
Compensation and the Interconnectedness of Property, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 327, 349 n.87
(1998) (stating that five Justices in Eastern Enterprises determined that the Takings Clause
only applies to regulations that deal with specific assets). But see Vermont Assembly of
Home Health Agencies, Inc. v. Shalala, 18 F. Supp. 2d 355, 369 (D. Vt. 1998) (citing
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Kennedy and the four dissenters proclaimed otherwise, their opinions
in Eastern Enterprises appear to contradict the portions of Connolly
and Concrete Pipe that applied the regulatory takings analysis to
purely economic regulations.145
Justice Kennedy purportedly relied on Connolly and Concrete
Pipe but interpreted those cases as requiring the Court to undertake
a substantive due process analysis first, proceeding to a Takings
Clause analysis only if the challenged statute is otherwise
permissible. 46 Justice Kennedy's interpretation of Connolly and
Concrete Pipe appears reasonable, because in those cases, the Court
followed that two-step process. 47  His purported reliance on
Connolly and Concrete Pipe, however, is not compelling after
considering the remainder of his opinion.
Later in his opinion, Justice Kennedy stated unequivocally that
because the Coal Act does not regulate property, the regulatory
takings analysis is not the appropriate analysis. 48 To invalidate the
Coal Act as applied to Eastern, however, Justice Kennedy did not
need to use the Takings Clause analysis because he asserted that the
specific application of the Coal Act violated the Due Process
Clause.149 Based on his interpretation of Connolly and Concrete
Eastern Enterprises as leaving in doubt the necessity of an identified property interest to
maintain a takings claim).
145. Justice O'Connor interpreted Connolly and Concrete Pipe as requiring a Takings
Clause analysis. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2149 (plurality opinion) (stating that
Connolly and Concrete Pipe "indicate that the regulatory takings framework is germane to
legislation of this sort").
146. See iL at 2157-58 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part)
("My reading of Connolly, and Concrete Pipe, is that we should proceed first to general
due process principles, reserving takings analysis for cases where the governmental action
is otherwise permissible.").
147. See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 636; Connolly, 475 U.S. at 223. The Connolly
opinion only addressed the takings issue. See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 223. The Court,
however, previously had addressed a due process challenge to the statute. See Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984).
148. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2155-56 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part) Justice Kennedy stated:
Until today... one constant limitation has been that in all of the cases where the
regulatory taking analysis has been employed, a specific property right or interest
has been at stake....
... The Coal Act neither targets a specific property interest nor depends upon
any particular property for the operation of its statutory mechanisms [making the
Takings Clause inapplicable].
Id.
149. See id. at 2154 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
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Pipe,5 ' his purported reliance on those cases would have required
that Justice Kennedy apply the regulatory takings analysis to the
Coal Act had he concluded that it did not violate the Due Process
Clause. But applying the takings analysis to that statute would
conflict with his statement that the Takings Clause does not apply to
the Coal Act. Based on this inconsistency, Justice Kennedy's stated
adherence to Connolly and Concrete Pipe in his Eastern Enterprises
opinion' is not compelling. Rather, a more reasonable
interpretation of Justice Kennedy's opinion in Eastern Enterprises is
that he would limit Connolly and Concrete Pipe to the extent those
cases espouse the view that the Takings Clause applies to purely
economic regulations such as the Coal Act.
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion also appears to contradict
those portions of Connolly and Concrete Pipe that apply the takings
analysis to economic regulations such as the Coal Act. Besides
agreeing with Justice Kennedy's statement that the Takings Clause is
inapplicable because the Coal Act does not regulate property, Justice
Breyer relied on the fact that the Coal Act requires payment to a
third party and not the government. 52 Justice Breyer stated that "the
Takings Clause had not been violated [in Connolly], in part because
'the Government does not physically invade or permanently
appropriate any ... assets for its own use.' "I" Neither of these
reasons, however, effectively distinguishes Connolly and Concrete
Pipe from Eastern Enterprises. In both Connolly and Concrete Pipe,
as in Eastern Enterprises, the statute at issue was a purely economic
regulation that required the plaintiff to make a payment to a third
party, not the government. 4 Justice Breyer's opinion directly
conflicts with the parts of Connolly and Concrete Pipe in which the
Court analyzed the challenged statute under the three-part
regulatory takings analysis. It is, therefore, reasonable to interpret
Justice Breyer's dissent as contradicting the parts of those cases that
150. See id. at 2157-58 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
151. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
152. See id. at 2162 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
153. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225).
154. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2146 (plurality opinion) (describing the statutes
from Connolly and Concrete Pipe as "somewhat similar legislative schemes"). Compare
Connolly, 475 U.S. at 221 (discussing Connolly's claim that the statute took its "assets" in
the form of a general liability), and Concrete Pipe & Prods. of California, Inc. v.
Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 643 (1993) (quoting Connolly in
characterizing the statute as simply imposing a liability to fund a pension plan), with
Eastern Enterprises, 118 S. Ct. at 2146 (plurality opinion) (quoting Connolly to
characterize the Coal Act).
1999] 1545
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
provide for the Takings Clause analysis in analyzing purely economic
regulations such as the Coal Act.155
Additional evidence that the concurring and dissenting opinions
in Eastern Enterprises contradict portions of Connolly and Concrete
Pipe is their changed view of "property" in Eastern Enterprises as
compared to Connolly. In Connolly, the Court implicitly
acknowledged that money or economic value is property. In its
review of Connolly's claim, the district court 5 6 did not addressed the
issue of whether or not a taking had occurred because it ruled that no
"property" was affected by the challenged statute.157 On appeal,
however, after mentioning the lower court's reasoning, the Supreme
Court proceeded to analyze whether the statute had effected a
taking.158 The Court had no reason to make this determination if it
believed "property" was not at issue. By dismissing the analysis of
the district court and analyzing whether a taking had occurred, the
Court indicated its agreement with the plaintiff's position that money
or economic value is property.59 In Eastern Enterprises, however,
five Justices stated that the Takings Clause was not applicable
because no property was at issue.60 Therefore, Eastern Enterprises
may indicate that a majority of the Court is no longer comfortable
with defining "property" for Takings Clause purposes as including
155. Justice Breyer also relied on the outcomes of Connolly and Concrete Pipe as a way
of distinguishing those cases from Eastern Enterprises. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at
2162 (Breyer, J., dissenting). However, the Court's rejection of the claim of a Takings
Clause violation in Connolly and Concrete Pipe seems to say little about whether or not
the Takings Clause provides the appropriate analytical framework in Eastern Enterprises.
156. After a three-judge panel of the district court ruled in favor of Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation, Connolly appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court under 28
U.S.C. § 1253. See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 221. Section 1253 gives the Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction over cases heard by a three-judge panel of the district court. See 28
U.S.C. § 1253 (1994).
157. See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 631 F. Supp. 640, 644-45 (C.D. Cal.
1984), aff'd, 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
158. See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 220.
159. In the district court, Connolly argued that its contractual right limiting its liability
was a property right that was taken by the statute. See Connolly, 631 F. Supp. at 645. The
district court ruled that a "contractual right which insulates employers from further
liability to the pension plans ... is not property within the meaning of the takings clause."
Id. In its case before the Supreme Court, however, Connolly asserted that the statute took
its "assets." See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 221. The Court did not directly address the issue of
whether or not "property" was at issue; however, the Court stated, "[w]e agree that
[Connolly was] permanently deprived of [its] assets." Id. at 222. This sentence seems to
indicate that the Court agreed with Connolly's definition of property and equates assets or
economic value with property.
160. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2154 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part); id. at 2161 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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economic value and applying the regulatory takings analysis to purely
economic regulations.16'
Expanding on some of Justice Breyer's concerns expressed in
Eastern Enterprises,62 several arguments exist for limiting the use of
the Takings Clause and instead relying on due process to analyze
purely economic regulations. 6  First, the text of the Fifth
Amendment indicates that the Due Process Clause, rather than the
Takings Clause, provides the more appropriate analysis for the
application of purely economic regulations-such as the Coal Act-
that simply adjust "the benefits and burdens of economic life."'" The
Due Process Clause is concerned with those regulations that
"deprive."' 6 The term "deprive" focuses on the regulation's impact
on the property owner.6 6 On the other hand, the Takings Clause
states that property shall not be "taken" without compensation. 67
The word "taken" indicates a deprivation on the part of the property
owner as well as a benefit or receipt by the government.68 The
difference in meaning between "deprive" and "take" indicates a
161. Justice Kennedy stated that "[tihe difficulties in determining whether there is a
taking or a regulation even where a property right or interest is identified ought to counsel
against extending the regulatory takings doctrine to cases [dealing with purely economic
regulations]." Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2155 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part). Justice Breyer, writing for the four dissenters, stated that the
"application of the Takings Clause here [to a purely economic regulation] bristles with
conceptual difficulties." Id- at 2162 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
162. Justice Breyer asked three questions in his opinion in an attempt to raise the
conceptual difficulties inherent in applying the Takings Clause to purely economic
regulations: (1) "If the Clause applies when the government simply orders A to pay B,
why does it not apply when the government simply orders A to pay the government, i.e.,
when it assesses a tax?," id (Breyer, J., dissenting); (2) "Would [the Takings Clause] apply
to some or to all statutes and rules that 'routinely creat[e] burdens for some that directly
benefit others'?," id (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Connolly, 475 U.S. at 223); (3)
"[Clould a court apply the same kind of Takings Clause analysis when violation means the
law's invalidation, rather than simply the payment of 'compensation?,'" id (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
163. To demonstrate these arguments, the discussion in this Note focuses on the Coal
Act. This assumes that the Coal Act accurately represents a purely economic regulation.
Justice O'Connor appears to agree with this assumption. See id. at 2146 ("[E]conomic
regulation such as the Coal Act may ... effect a taking.") (plurality opinion) (emphasis
added).
164. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
165. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
166. See Echeverria & Dennis, supra note 6, at 710. Webster's defines "deprive" as "to
take away" or to "remove" or "destroy." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 606 (1993).
167. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
168. Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "take" as "to gain or receive into
possession." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1453 (6th ed. 1990).
1547
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
broader scope for the Due Process Clause than the Takings Clause; a
"taking" is not necessarily effected upon every deprivation of
property.'69 It could be argued that this broader scope means that the
Takings Clause was not intended to apply to purely economic
regulations-those regulations that simply adjust economic benefits
and burdens. 17° For example, the Coal Act required Eastern to pay
premiums to the Combined Fund, not the government; 71 the Coal
Act "deprived" Eastern of money, but the government did not "take"
money from Eastern. The text and scope of the Due Process Clause
may therefore more appropriately addresses challenges to purely
economic regulations than does the Takings Clause.
The above argument suggests a reason why the Takings Clause
should not apply to regulations requiring private party A to pay
private party B, but it does not address those economic regulations in
which the government actually receives money. The remedy
available under the Takings Clause, however, indicates that it is
inappropriate when applied to all purely economic regulations.172
The Takings Clause is not a legal limit on governmental power to act;
instead, it simply conditions that power on compensation.173
Therefore, if Congress decides that the government should take
private property for a public purpose, the government can do so as
169. See Echeverria & Dennis, supra note 6, at 710 (stating that the Takings Clause is
more narrow in scope than the Due Process Clause because the Takings Clause requires a
deprivation and an appropriation by the government).
170. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2161-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Connolly
as support for the argument that the regulation at issue did not violate the Takings Clause,
in part because the government did not receive assets for its own use). If economic
regulations are those regulations that require private party A to pay private party B, like
the Coal Act, Echeverria and Dennis seem to agree with this conclusion. See Echeverria
& Dennis, supra note 6, at 710; see also John V. Orth, Taking from A and Giving to B:
Substantive Due Process and the Case of the Shifting Paradigm, 14 CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMENTARY 337, 344 (1997) (stating that "the paradigm of what due process prohibited
enlarged to include... 'taking from A and giving to B' ").
171. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2156 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part) ("[T]he statute does not take money for the Government but
instead makes it payable to third persons .... ).
172 Cf. Woodrum & Rothman, supra note 34, at 653 (citing Connolly as a case in
which the Court applied the Takings Clause even though a compensation remedy would
be meaningless because a purely economic regulation was at issue).
173. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 315 (1987) ("[The Takings Clause] is designed not to limit the governmental
interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of
otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking."). Even though the Takings Clause
imposes no legal limit on governmental action, requiring compensation may create
practical or political limits. See McUsic, supra note 13, at 644 (stating that in many
situations, requiring compensation is equivalent to striking down a statute).
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long as it compensates the property owner. If, however, the Court
classifies the government's appropriation of money as a "taking," the
Court effectively overturns Congress's judgment,17 4 as can be seen
from the plurality's analysis of the Coal Act in Eastern Enterprises.175
The Coal Act expresses Congress's judgment that coal operators
such as Eastern, rather than the taxpayers, should be responsible for
the health care benefits of certain miners. 176  Consistent with the
plurality's conclusion that the Coal Act effects a "taking," the only
way Congress can constitutionally impose liability on Eastern under
the Coal Act, as currently written, is to compensate Eastern for the
liability.17 7  If Congress compensates Eastern, then the taxpayers
would be paying the miners' benefits, which is in direct conflict with
Congress's implicit judgment that Eastern should pay for the
benefits. In so holding, the plurality used the Takings Clause to
174. The following hypothetical demonstrates this point. Assume that Congress passes
a law requiring all utility companies to pay money to the government each year to be set
aside to combat pollution by such utilities. If the companies sued and the Court
invalidated this regulation under the Takings Clause, the regulation could only survive if
the government paid the utility companies; obviously, government payments to the
utilities would render the regulation pointless. In this hypothetical, the Takings Clause
essentially would prevent government regulation-a role the Clause was not intended to
serve. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the Takings
Clause).
175. Granted, the Coal Act is an A to B economic regulation; however, who A is
required to pay is not relevant for this analysis.
176. See Brief for Federal Respondent at 5-8, Eastern Enters. (No. 97-42). Obviously,
Congress could have imposed this liability on the taxpayers by paying the benefits out of
general government funds, but in Congress's judgment the obligation belonged to coal
companies. If the Court does not agree with and wants to overturn the judgment of
Congress, the Court should alter due process review rather than distorting the Takings
Clause. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
177. Upon finding that a statute has violated the Takings Clause, the government
generally has three choices: (1) amend the regulation; (2) rescind the regulation; or (3)
pay for the property under eminent domain. See First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church, 482 U.S. at 321. Obviously, choices one and two do not permit Congress to
impose liability on Eastern under the current Coal Act; therefore, Congress must pay to
enforce the statute.
178. This result does not occur when a regulation of "property" is ruled to be a
"taking." For example, if the government rationally decides to limit a landowner's use of
her property for a public purpose, the Court cannot stop the government from doing so;
the Court can only require that the government pay the landowner for her loss of use. See
Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 11 (1990) (" 'If the government has
provided an adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if resort to that process
'yield[s] just compensation,' then the property owner 'has no claim against the
Government' for a taking.'" (quoting Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194-95 (1985) (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsato Co., 467
U.S. 986,1013,1018 n.21 (1984))); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. 264, 297 n.40 (1981) (holding that a taking by virtue of a statute's enactment is
not unconstitutional unless just compensation is not available). Therefore, the
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effectively prevent the enforcement of Congress's judgment 79
Obviously, the Court has a duty to enjoin the enforcement of a
statute conflicting with the Constitution;1 80 the Takings Clause,
however, was not intended to give the Court such power. 81
In addition to deciding that the Takings Clause should not apply
to purely economic regulations, the opinions of Justices Kennedy and
Breyer in Eastern Enterprises also establish a foundation for limiting
the regulatory takings analysis to regulations that are otherwise
permissible. Justice Breyer stated that "at the heart of the [Takings]
Clause lies a concern, not with preventing arbitrary or unfair
government action, but with providing compensation for legitimate
government action that takes 'private property' to serve the 'public'
good."'" Similarly, Justice Kennedy interpreted Connolly and
Concrete Pipe as requiring application of the Takings Clause analysis
only when the regulation at issue was otherwise permissible; 8 3 that is,
if the regulation at issue is invalidated as arbitrary or irrational, the
Takings Clause would be inapplicable."8 Therefore, not only did five
government's judgment that the use of the land should be limited is not overturned.
179. This statement assumes that if Congress decided to fund the health care benefits
of the miners, it would do so out of government tax revenues.
180. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
181. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (noting that the Takings Clause is
intended to condition governmental action, not prevent it).
The remedial complication of using the Takings Clause to challenge purely economic
regulations was identified by John Woodrum and Larry Rothman in their article
discussing the constitutionality of legislative proposals leading to the enactment of the
Coal Act. See Woodrum & Rothman, supra note 34, at 653. Citing Connolly, they noted
that the Court, however, had ignored this complication and had applied the Takings
Clause where the typical remedy under the Takings Clause, compensation, would have
been meaningless. See id.
Justice O'Connor, in Eastern Enterprises, also realized the remedial complications of
discussing a purely economic regulation under the Takings Clause. See Eastern Enters.,
118 S. Ct. at 2145 (plurality opinion). Prior to the Court's hearing of Eastern Enters., the
government had challenged the Court's jurisdiction to hear the case because Eastern had
not requested compensation in the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act. See supra note
57 (discussing the Tucker Act and the Court's ruling). Even though the government
dropped its challenge to the jurisdictional issue, Justice O'Connor stated that when a
statute requires a direct transfer of funds, a claim for compensation "''would entail an
utterly pointless set of activities.' " Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2145 (plurality opinion)
(quoting Student Loan Mktg. Ass'n. v. Riley, 104 F.3d 397, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). A
determination that the remedy available for a violation of the Takings Clause is
"pointless" further demonstrates that the Takings Clause is not appropriate for review of
purely economic regulation. See infra notes 187-206 and accompanying text (suggesting
that Justice O'Connor in Eastern Enterprises inappropriately imported due process
concerns into her Takings Clause analysis).
182. Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2161 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
183. See id. at 2157-58 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
184. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
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Justices assert that the Takings Clause should be limited to
regulations that affect "property," but these same five Justices also
asserted that the purpose of the Takings Clause is to provide
compensation for legitimate government action that takes property.8 5
Thus, if government regulations are to be invalidated as arbitrary,
such invalidation should be done under the Due Process Clause. 6
The plurality opinion stands in contrast to the opinions of
Justices Kennedy and Breyer. Rather than distinguishing the
Takings Clause from the Due Process Clause, the plurality imported
substantive due process principles into its Takings Clause analysis.
The plurality admitted that the Coal Act raised due process concerns
but applied the regulatory takings analysis because it did not want to
invalidate an economic regulation using the Due Process Clause.Y7 A
close analysis of the plurality's takings analysis in Eastern Enterprises,
however, indicates that it overturned the Coal Act due to its belief
that Eastern was not responsible for the coal miners' expectations
and that it would be unfair to hold Eastern responsible for a liability
it did not cause.'
The plurality began its analysis of economic impact by discussing
the substantial liability imposed by the Coal Act; in deciding on the
constitutionality of that liability, however, its analysis focused on the
proportionality of Eastern's liability under the Coal Act to Eastern's
experience with the benefit plans.8 9 Ultimately, it determined that
the liability was not proportional to Eastern's experience with the
benefit plans because Eastern had ceased coal mining operations
before lifetime health care was promised to the miners, and Eastern
185. See id. at 2161 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the purpose of the Takings
Clause is to provide compensation for legitimate government action that takes private
property); id. at 2157 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part)
(stating that "the [Takings] Clause presupposes what the Government intends to do is
otherwise constitutional" and is simply a "conditional limitation" as long as the
government "pays the charge").
186. See id. at 2161, 2163 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (comparing the Due Process Clause,
which safeguards citizens from arbitrary or irrational legislation, to the Takings Clause,
which provides compensation for legitimate government action that takes private property
for a public purpose); id at 2157 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting
in part) (interpreting Connolly and Concrete Pipe as requiring the Takings Clause analysis
only when the regulation at issue is otherwise permissible).
187. See id. at 2153 (plurality opinion) (conceding that while the Takings Clause and
the Due Process Clause analyses are correlated to some extent, the Takings Clause
analysis is preferred because "this Court has expressed concerns about using the Due
Process Clause to invalidate economic legislation").
188. Cf. Leading Cases, supra note 61, at 220-21 (stating that all nine Justices in Eastern
Enterprises focused on whether or not the Coal Act was retroactive).
189. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2149 (plurality opinion).
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did not negotiate or sign any agreements that promised lifetime
health care benefits. 190 In focusing on the relationship between
Eastern's previous actions and liability imposed by the Coal Act, the
plurality appears to have been concerned with the rationality of
imposing liability on Eastern Enterprises.
The second factor of the plurality's regulatory Takings Clause
analysis is the Coal Act's interference with reasonable investment-
backed expectations.19' In determining that the Coal Act interfered
with Eastern's reasonable investment-backed expectations, the
plurality relied heavily on the statute's retroactive nature,' 9
concluding that the statute's retroactivity implicates concerns of
rationality and fairness. 9'
Finally, in analyzing the third regulatory takings factor-the
nature of the governmental action-the plurality relied heavily on
the plurality's decision that Eastern did not promise the miners
health care benefits.'94  It noted that Eastern's liability was
"unrelated to any commitment that [Eastern] made" and that
"Eastern cannot be forced to bear the expense of lifetime health
benefits for miners based on its activities decades before those
benefits were promised." 95 Its analysis of the character of the
government action suggested that the Coal Act is unfair and
irrational because Eastern did not create the employees' expectations
and Eastern had exited the coal business years before any benefits
were promised. 6
190. See id. at 2150 (plurality opinion).
191. See id. at 2151 (plurality opinion).
192 See id. at 2151-54 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor stated that "the Coal Act
operates retroactively, divesting Eastern of property long after the company believed its
liabilities under the 1950 W&R Fund to have been settled." Id. at 2152 (plurality opinion).
193. See id. at 2151 (plurality opinion); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270
(1994). As Justice O'Connor herself stated in the Eastern Enterprises opinion, "[t]he
distance into the past that the Act reaches back to impose liability on Eastern ... raise[s]
substantial questions of fairness." Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2152 (plurality opinion).
194. See id. at 2153 (plurality opinion).
195. Id. (plurality opinion).
196. The plurality's analysis of the "nature" or "character" of the Coal Act, as is
required by the third prong of the regulatory takings analysis, is not faithful to its
precedent. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the
Court looked to the character or nature of the governmental action to highlight the
difference between a physical invasion by the government, which is more readily
recognized as a taking, and economic regulation. See id. at 124. In Eastern Enterprises,
the plurality altered the analysis, stating that the Coal Act as applied to Eastern is
"unusual." Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2153 (plurality opinion). Whether "unusual"
means that it is more like a physical invasion or more like a economic regulation is
unclear.
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Given that the plurality's invalidation of the Coal Act was
dictated by a concern regarding rationality and fairness,197 the Due
Process Clause would appear to have been a more appropriate
constitutional tool. First, invalidating legislation as retroactive and
arbitrary, while a legitimate reason to prevent the application of a
statute, is not a part of the Court's Takings Clause jurisprudence.
Rather, the text of the Takings Clause speaks to legislation that is
otherwise permissible and rational: the taking of private property for
public purpose. 19 8
Second, the plurality's regulatory takings analysis in Eastern
Enterprises rings the Lochner99 warning bell because it essentially
197. Justice Kennedy and the four dissenters were also concerned about the fairness of
the retroactive nature of the Coal Act as it applied to Eastern. See Eastern Enters., 118 S.
Ct. at 2159 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); id. at 2161,
2164-68 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Justices's differing resolutions of the fairness issue
can be attributed to a difference of opinion regarding the facts. The five Justices who
ruled that the Coal Act as applied to Eastern violated the Fifth Amendment agreed that
Eastern did not contribute to the current liability of the Combined Fund, nor did it
contribute to the miners' expectation of lifetime health care benefits. See id. at 2152
(plurality opinion) (stating that neither the pre-1974 agreements nor congressional
statements support the contention that Eastern contributed to the miners' expectations);
id. at 2159 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (stating that
Eastern "was not responsible for [the miners'] expectation of lifetime health benefits");
see also Leading Cases, supra note 61, at 219-21 (arguing that the plurality's opinion in
Eastern Enterprises hinged on the concern that the Coal Act held Eastern retroactively
responsible for a problem it did not cause). Such a view of the facts leads to the
conclusion that the Coal Act was unfair as applied to Eastern. On the other hand, the
dissent believed that Eastern had contributed to the miners' expectations of lifetime
healthcare benefits and that the entire coal industry, including Eastern Enterprises, had
implicitly promised the miners lifetime health care benefits. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct.
at 2161 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Eastern helped to create conditions that led the miners to
expect continued health care benefits for themselves and their families after they
retired."); id. at 2160 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]here was an implicit understanding on
both sides of the bargaining table that the operators would provide the miners with
lifetime health benefits."). The Coal Act, as applied to Eastern Enterprises, seems much
more rational and fair if Eastern is presumed to be responsible for creating the miners'
expectations for lifetime health care.
198. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555,
572 (1997) ("The Takings Clause does not address itself to irrational governmental action;
to the contrary, its text speaks directly to occasions of presumptively rational
governmental behavior: the taking of private property for a public purpose."); Katherine
E. Stone & Philip A. Seymour, Regulating the Timing of Development: Takings Clause
and Substantive Due Process Challenges to Growth Control Regulations, 24 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 1205, 1230 (1991) ("Arguably, takings analysis should not address the propriety of
governmental regulations at all, but merely whether the damage is sufficient to amount to
a taking.").
199. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the Supreme Court relied
on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate a statute limiting
the hours that bakers could work. See ic. at 53. While the Court's abandonment of the
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made the same judgments about the Coal Act that it would have
made had it used the rational basis review under the Due Process
Clause.2"0 Under rational basis review, a regulation is upheld if a
court can find a rational relationship between the regulation and a
legitimate state objective.2 1 In its takings analysis, the plurality
focused on the correlation between Eastern's actions and the miners'
expectations.2  Such an analysis is more similar to rational basis
review under substantive due process than to an investigation as to
whether or not the Coal Act has gone "too far. ' 23 What implicates
Lochner even more emphatically, however, is the lack of legislative
deference associated with the Takings Clause.2 4  Unlike the
rationale of Lochner has been complete, the case is still cited as representing the height of
"'judicial activism': an illegitimate intrusion by the courts into the realm properly
reserved to the political branches of government." Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 873, 874 (1987); see also STONE ET AL., supra note 9, at 828 (stating that
one of the objections to Lochner is that the Court interfered in the realm of
policymaking). Not all disagree with the concept Lochner, however. See, e.g., RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWERS OF EMINENT DOMAIN 5
(1985) (arguing in support of the Court's Lochner era jurisprudence. For a recent look at
Lochner, see PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL
(1998).
200. Paul Kens recently commented on the similarity between the current Court's
takings jurisprudence and Lochner. See KENS, supra note 199, at 184-85.
201. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483,489 (1955); United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938); NOWVAK & ROTUNDA, supra note
7, § 11.4, at 391.
202. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2150 (plurality opinion).
203. "Too far" refers to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's famous quote from
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("The general rule ... is that
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.").
204. Not only is legislative deference not a part of the Takings Clause, but the
government may actually have the burden of proving that it should not be required to
compensate the property owner. See Echeverria & Dennis, supra note 6, at 704 (stating
that "the burden of proof [in takings inquiries] subtly shifts to the government"). The
Ninth Circuit has recently ruled that a city had the burden to prove that its denial of a
development permit was reasonable, see City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes of
Monterey, Ltd., 127 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 1997), but the Supreme Court has granted
certiorari on this issue, see City of Monterey, 118 S. Ct. 1359 (1998). See also David G.
Savage, Land of Opportunity: Can Property Owners Sue over a City's Regulatory
Decision?, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 34, 34 (discussing the case). A decision is expected by
the end of the 1998 Term.
The plurality appears to have invalidated the Coal Act under the Takings Clause
instead of the Due Process Clause for fear of a return to Lochner. See Eastern Enters., 118
S. Ct. at 2153 (plurality opinion) (stating that the Court has expressed concerns about
using the Due Process Clause to invalidate economic regulations). Interestingly, the
plurality did not discuss how its takings analysis avoids the same Lochner pitfalls. See
Summers, supra note 10, at 885 (arguing that the importation of due process principles
into Takings Clause jurisprudence subjects the Takings Clause to the same problems and
criticisms that led to the demise of Lochner-style substantive due process).
TAKINGS AND DUE PROCESS CLA USES
regulatory takings analysis, Due Process Clause analysis of economic
regulations includes a history of legislative deference that ensures
that rational judgments of Congress are upheld."5 The plurality,
however, believed the Coal Act as applied to Eastern was unfair and
should be invalidated. But if the plurality is unhappy with the level
of scrutiny provided by the Due Process Clause, it should alter
substantive due process review of economic regulations rather than
distorting the Takings Clause.2
06
In the future, plaintiffs likely will rely on Eastern Enterprises
when challenging economic regulations.' 7 The courts could use these
future cases as opportunities to define more clearly the roles of the
Due Process and Takings Clauses. To start, the Court could follow
the lead of the concurring and dissenting opinions in Eastern
Enterprises and use the Due Process Clause, rather than the Takings
Clause, for review of purely economic regulations .2 0  Limiting the
Takings Clause in this way would be a first step in clarifying the
appropriate uses of the two clauses and would allow federal and state
legislatures to enact economic regulations without concerns of being
second-guessed by courts applying a non-deferential standard of
review. Additionally, the Court could limit the use of the regulatory
takings analysis to otherwise legitimate regulations-those
regulations that have met all other constitutional mandates. Such a
limitation may assist the Court in beginning to remove the
205. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 (stating that the purpose of the Due Process
Clause is to see whether "in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed [the
regulation] is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some
rational basis"); see also ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 125
(2d ed. 1994) ("It is hard to conceive a law so patently unreasonable that it would fail
under [the due process rationality] test .... ).
206. See Summers, supra note 10, at 872. Summers makes two good points in his
Comment. First, the Court should stop using the Takings Clause to accomplish what no
longer can be done under substantive due process; if the Court is unhappy with the
substantive due process standard, then it should change the standard. See id. at 872, 885.
Second, Summers argues that importing substantive due process principles into the takings
analysis will lead the Takings Clause to the same fate as Lochner substantive due process.
See id. at 885.
207. The reliance on Eastern Enterprises has already begun. See Association of
Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Apfel, 156 F.3d 1246, 1253-58 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (rejecting a
plaintiff's assertion that Eastern Enterprises compels the court to conclude that the statute
at issue was unconstitutional because it was retroactive); United States v. Vertac Chem.
Corp., No. LR-C-80-109, 1998 WL 842868, at *15-*16 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 23, 1998) (finding
that Eastern Enterprises's holding that the retroactive provisions of the Coal Act are
unconstitutional under the Takings Clause is not applicable).
208. See Summers, supra note 10, at 872 (stating that if the Court is unsatisfied with its
level of review under the Due Process Clause, it should fix the Due Process Clause rather
than expanding the Takings Clause).
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substantive due process principles from the regulatory takings
analysis .2 9 Distinguishing the Takings and Due Process Clauses in
these two ways could begin the process of establishing some
functional independence between the Clauses, and would be an
important step toward demystifying an area of law that is already
"one of the most difficult and litigated.12 1
JOHN DECKER BRISTOW
209. See KENS, supra note 199, at 184-85 (commenting on the similarity between the
current Court's takings jurisprudence and the analysis in Lochner); Stone & Seymour,
supra note 198, at 1230 ("Arguably, takings analysis should not address the propriety of
governmental regulations at all, but merely whether the damage is sufficient to amount to
a taking."); Summers, supra note 10, at 885 (commenting that regulatory takings analysis
may be doomed for the same fate as substantive due process review of economic
regulations if the Court does not remove substantive due process principles from the
regulatory takings analysis).
The current Court, however, may not want to revitalize substantive due process
principles. Expanding the Takings Clause instead of the Due Process Clause allows the
Court to protect private property and economic rights without affecting the Court's
position on civil liberties, such as abortion, which historically have been grounded in the
Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
210. Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2155 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part) (discussing the regulatory takings doctrine).
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